Behavioral researchers argue that while individuals often rely on heuristics or rules of thumb that reduce the complexity involved in predicting values, such heuristics can lead to severe and systematic errors. I test this argument in an investment context by focusing on a simple heuristic whereby momentum traders are attracted to buying stocks that have recently doubled in price in anticipation of further gains. I show that such a strategy can lead to predictable disappointment for these investors and severe underperformance relative to the market (-28% over a four-year period), whereas investors who avoid relying on this simple heuristic are likely to perform as expected, on average similar to the overall market. The reversals in addition to past performance per se, as uncovered in other studies.
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This paper tests the argument by behavioral researchers Tversky and Kahneman (1974) in their seminal work, that individuals often rely on heuristics or rules of thumb that reduce the complexity involved in predicting values, but such heuristics can lead to severe and systematic errors. I test their argument in the context of investments by focusing on a simple heuristic whereby investors are attracted to buying stocks that have recently doubled in price in anticipation of further gains. Such a study is important because I show that a strategy of buying stocks that have recently doubled in price can lead to predictable disappointment for these investors and severe underperformance relative to the market (-28% over a fouryear period), whereas investors who avoid relying on this simple heuristic are likely to perform as expected, on average similar to the overall market. a significant predictor of future price reversals in addition to past performance per se, as uncovered by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) in their well-known overreaction study. Thus based on this study investors can become aware of the dangers of relying on simple heuristics and can avoid disappointment in investment returns.
vated by axioms highlighted in previous research, investment books, and the popular press due to its simplicity, since any investor can readily relate to and strive for such doubling performance those that have doubled within a calendar year, with his sample firms drawn primarily from
The Greatest Stock Market Winners: 1970 Winners: -1983 . 1 Previous studies suggest that investors may be influenced by perceived price trends. DeBondt (1993) argues that, besides fundamental explanations, there are two other possible explanations as to why stock prices fluctuate, both of which are related to individual investor psychology and systematic misperceptions of value. First, investors put too much emphasis on the latest information and not enough on base-rate information, an investors tend to discover trends in past prices and expect such trends to continue. DeBondt (1993) experiments by giving subjects 48 months of past prices for a variety of series and asks them to predict prices 7 and 13 months in the future. Based on 38,000
forecasts of stock prices and exchange rates he finds that non-expert individual investors expect a continuation of apparent past trends in prices. 2 More recently, He and Shen (2010) estimate expected returns directly from stock prices and financial information and
show that investor expectations are overoptimistic for stocks that recently experienced high returns.
This study attempts to replicate the data-gathering behavior and performance of some positive feedback 3 or momentum traders who follow a simple price-trend heuristic to make investment decisions. I begin with a sample universe that contains a high proportion of stocks with a period.
The primary screen disclaimer that past performance is not indicative of future results, as the studies above suggest, past performance is frequently used (for example, by positive feedback traders)
as at least one important investment criterion. I argue that of particular appeal are any stocks that have doubled in price in the recent past, which I arbitrarily define as within the last four years (DeBondt (1993) presents subjects with four years of historical data).
Identifying that a stock has recently doubled in price is a simple reference point for an individual investor, much simpler, say, then identifying a stock as being in the lowest decile of returns within a particular dataset over a particular sample period (as is common in many studies) in the former case, all that is required is the recent price history of that one stock while in the latter case one needs to make a relative comparison over a much larger sample. I screen on month-end stock prices for up to 48 months. If a stock has 2 In other experiments, Andreassen and Kraus (1990) find that subjects are more likely to buy as prices rise when the change in price is high; Baltussen (2009) notes that investors can be persistent in their beliefs and once they are convinced a particular stock will increase in price they will underweight any evidence suggesting otherwise. 3 See De Long et al. (1990) for a discussion of positive feedback traders.
should appeal to positive feedback traders and is immediately placed in the investment universe (e.g., if a stock doubles in price after 18 months then no more history is required). Momentum stocks would typically fall under the stellar stock category so long as the stock has doubled reasonably quickly (e.g., in a 12-month period).
The other performance--stocks, i.e., those that do not double in price but yet still have a complete four-year track record. Such stocks might form the universe for all other investors, whom I refer to as the fundamentalists. Value stocks would typically fall under this category. Note that any stock with a shorter track record (e.g., because it has gone bankrupt or has no longer met the listing requirements of the exchange) is not included in either investment universe and thus a -survivorship bias is induced in the screening period. However, as I discuss below, there is no survivorship bias in the testing period.
In this study, I find an almost even split of the stocks in this survivorship-biased screening period sample that have at least doubled in price versus those that have not, with a total sample (i.e., doubled and non-double stocks) median annual return of 20.1%
or a median excess-of-market return of 10.1%. However, in a subsequent four-year (survivorship-bias-free) investment period, only about a quarter of the total sample stock prices doubled (or more), with a total sample median annual return of a disappointing 6.6% (excess-of-market return of -3.6%). Those that doubled in the screening period are less likely to double subsequently than those that had not doubled previously, invariably leading to disappointment for the positive feedback trader group. The cumulative excess return after four years for those stocks is -28.0%. In contrast, fundamentalists who invest in stocks that did not double during the screening period experience near-zero cumulative execs returns after four years (-0.2%).
I then investigate the extent to which stock returns for this sample are predictable and thus whereby investors can improve their chances of investment success. Much of the cross-sectional variation in investment period returns can be explained not only by past stock performance (a negative relationship) and test period (or investment period) market returns (a positive relationship as expected), but also whether the stock has recently doubled in price (negative), past earnings (a positive relationship), and various valuationrelated metrics measured at the start of the investment period. A probit model identifies ex ante variables that are able to predict whether or not a stock will at least double in value over the investment period. An investment strategy based on the predicted probability of a stock doubling offers large potential rewards.
While this study is related in particular to the overreaction or contrarian profits literature and papers such as DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) , it is nonetheless distinct in a number of ways. First, instead of focusing on categorizing stocks in portfolios based on relies on one simple heuristic readily available to any investor with a recent history of past stocks prices identifying whether a stock has doubled in price within the past four years. Second, this study relies on a much more extensive sample of firm-observations, including over 5,000
cases of firms that have doubled during the screening period. In contrast, DeBondt and (1998, 1999) , Barber and Odean (2000 , 2001 , 2005 , Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000, 2001) , Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003), Coval, Hirshleifer, and Sumway (2005) , Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2006) , Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean (2006), San (2007) , and Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2008) . 6 See Blume and Friend (1975) and, more recently, Barber and Odean (2000) , Polkovnichenko (2005) , Ivkovic, Sialm and Weisbenner (2008) and Goetzmann and Kumar (2007) . 7 See Samuelson (1965 ), Fama (1970 and others. 8 In an investments context, see also studies by Shefrin and Statman (1984, 1985) , and Lakonishok et al. the recent simultaneous overvaluation of many firms will occur only occasionally we can expect there to be problems with a few substantially overvalued firms on an annual
While it is often difficult to determine whether a stock, or a market for that matter, is overvalued until after-the-fact, one can at least measure proxies for overvaluation, such as the speed of dramatic price changes (e.g., doubling in price).
While it is generally accepted that overvaluation (and under-valuation) Second, this study uncovers the predictability of stock returns based on a simple yet unique heuristic not employed in previous studies. I show that a simple variable that indicates whether a stock has recently doubled in price can be an incremental predictor of future stock performance in addition to past performance per se as uncovered in previous studies.
11 See Poterba and Summers (1988) , Lehman (1990) , Jegadessh (1990), and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) for shorter horizons and DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) , Poertba and Summers (1988) , Fama and French (1988) , and Jegadessh and Titman (2001) for longer horizons. 12 See Chan (1988), Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Chopara, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992) , Jones (1993), and Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) . See also studies related to overreaction or momentum by Ball et al. (1995) , Fama and French (1996) , Richards (1997) , Veronesi (1999) Hong et al. (2000), Lee and Swaminathan (2000) , Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) , and George and Hwang (2004), and behavioral model explanations by Daniel et al. (1998) , Barberis et al. (1998), and Hong and Stein (1999) . 13 For example see Brown et al. (1992) and Liang (2000).
Data and Methodology
The underlying premise of this study is that the frame of reference used by positive feedback traders to screen stocks based on past performance leads to a biased sample of generally well-performing stocks and hence can lead to inevitable disappointment of future stock performance. It is also conjectured that stocks that have doubled in price during the screening period are more likely to experience negative or moderate returns during the test period, and such performance has a predictable element.
An important design innovation of this study is to remove the somewhat rigid constraint of many previous studies that examined price changes over fixed periods such as one, three, or five years, but rather this study uses a more flexible screening period that takes into account the degree of a rapid price changes (such as a doubling of the price level)
that may occur over a particular period. This design is meant to capture a more realistic investing approach that replicates much of the emotional side of investing: if an investor knows a stock has recently doubled in value it is more likely to get his/her attention. and thus form the sample set for the fundamentalists. For those firms in the former category, this implies an annualized return of at least 19% but perhaps much greater depending on the time it takes for the stock price to double. At this point, a number of firm-specific and market-wide attributes are measured, including: the dollar value of annualized earnings per share, earn -to-price ratio divided by the S&P 500 earnings-to-price ratio, relep -to-market ratio divided by the S&P 500 book-to-market ratio, relbm; the annualized dividend per share divided by the price per share, divyld; the natural log of the market value of equity in millions of dollars, size; scrmo; as well as the corresponding average monthly S&P 500 return during the screening period, scsprmo.
Returns are measured excluding dividends in order to focus on price changes. These variables are used to predict subsequent fourthe return during the test period, tsrmo, as well as the corresponding average monthly S&P 500 return during the test period, tssprmo, are measured. -of-screening-period earnings-to-price ratio divided by the corresponding S&P 500 earnings-to-price ratio, relep -of-screening-period book-to-market ratio divided by the corresponding S&P 500 book-to-market ratio, relbm;
-of-screening-period annualized dividend per share divided by the price per share, divyld -of-screening-period natural log of the market value of equity in millions of dollars, size; and sic1 through sic9 are dummy variables equal to 1 corresponding to the nine industries organized by SIC codes (SIC<1000 is Agricultural, and those that did not (ddbl=0, the fundamentalist sample) for the key variables. Note that the variables are measured as of the end of the screening period (which is also the start of the testing period). There is no significant difference in the average earnings per share.
Firms that doubled during the screening period had lower relative book-to-market ratios which tend to be associated with growth stocks. Somewhat surprisingly larger firms tended to double more frequently. One possible explanation is that many of the low priced and thus small market capitalization stocks have been eliminated from this sample.
Thus given the biased screening technique, it appears that it is larger growth stocks that have done better in the past, in contrast to the well-known results of Fama and French (1992, 1993) and provides another possible explanation as to why positive feedback traders are disappointed: they have a tendency to choose attractive-looking growth and large cap stocks whereas value and small cap stocks tend to do better over the long-term.
Consistent with the overreaction literature, stocks that did not double during the screening period have (by design) lower screening period returns than those that did double, but then higher test period returns. Note that these results are not being driven by market returns as the test period corresponding market returns are virtually the same for both the sample of stocks that doubled in the screening period and those that did not.
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T he Predictability of F uture Performance of Individual Stocks
The second part of this study examines the predictability of stock returns for this particular screening period sample and subsequent four-year horizon test period. The tsrmo.
Univariate regression analysis results are presented in T able 3. The independent variables 14 I also examine test period versus screening period returns by industry (see Moskowiz and Grinblatt (1999) ). In all cases returns are significantly different.
are Winsorized by capping the extreme observations at the 1% and 99% cutoffs in Table   1 .
Testing period returns are significantly and negatively related to screening period returns, scrmo, consistent with mean-reversion and the overreaction literature. As well, firms that doubled in the screening period as indicated by the dummy variable ddbl, are more likely to experience lower testing period returns. Firms that experienced negative earnings during the screening period as indicated by the dummy variable dearn, are also more likely to experience lower testing period returns. Not surprisingly, testing period returns are positively related to the testing period market return, tssprmo, and the explanatory power as measured by the adjusted R-square is a similar order of magnitude to that of the screening period returns. Testing period returns are positively related to the relative bookto-market variable, relbm, and the relative price-to-earnings variable, relep, but the coefficients are not significant. Testing period returns are positively related to the dividend yield, divyld, suggesting that lower priced stocks (and hence those with higher dividend yields) tend to do better in the future. Finally, the size variable, size, is positively related to future returns but the coefficient estimate is quite small and the regression intercept is negative.
Multivariate regression results are presented in T able 4. Regressions 1 and 2 are ex ante models based strictly on information available at the start of the test period while regressions 3 and 4 include the test period market return variable, tssprmo. In all regressions, the screening period return coefficient, scrmo, is negative and significant, consistent with the univariate regression .
However, the main focus of this study is the double-in-screening-period dummy variable coefficient, ddbl, which is also negative and significant, which suggests that simply knowing whether a stock has recently doubled in value provides important incremental information in terms of predicting future stock returns.
The negative earnings dummy variable coefficient, dearn, is negative and significant in this and all regressions, consistent with the univariate regressions. The relative earnings-price and book-to-market coefficients, relep and relbm respectively, are not significant.
Unlike the univariate regression, the dividend yield coefficient, divyld, is consistently negative and significant across all regressions, suggesting higher priced stocks (and hence lower dividend yield stocks) tend to do better in the test period, although the dividends. Consistent with the univariate analysis, the size coefficient, size, is positive and significant across regressions. Regressions 2 and 4 control for any industry differences. Only the Mining Industry dummy coefficient, sic2, is significant across the various industries, while the other variable coefficients are of similar sign, size, and significance. Regressions 3 and 4 add a test period market return variable, tssprmo, which is positive and significant as expected. The significance is similar to that of the screening period return, scrmo.
To summarize, much of the variability of the test period returns can be explained by variables available at the beginning of the test period, indicating that returns have a predictable component. The double-in-screening-period dummy is a new variable with incremental predictive power that has not been uncovered in past studies.
Probit analysis results are presented in T able 5. The dependent variable is a dummy has fewer than 48 monthly observations then if the average monthly compound return, tsrmo, is greater than or equal to a rate that implies doubling over 48 months) and zero otherwise, ddbl2. The independent variables include the variables in Table 4 excluding the test period market return (since it is a contemporaneous variable) and the industry dummies (since they are generally not significant): the screening period return, scrmo; ddbl during the screening period and zero otherwise; dearn which is a dummy variable equal -of-screening-period earnings were negative and zero otherwise; the relative book-to-market ratio, relbm; the relative earnings-price ratio, relep; the dividend yield, divyld; and firm size, size; Note that all of the independent variables are measured as of the end of the screening period (i.e., as of the start of the testing period). As described above, since I use individual stocks (as opposed to the more common portfolio he independent variables are Winsorized based on the 1% and 99% cutoffs in Table 1 .
The probability of doubling during the test period is significantly and negatively related to the screening period return, but consistent with the regression analysis the double-inscreening-period dummy is also significant and negative, suggesting that this latter variable has incremental predictive power to predict whether a stock will double in the subsequent four-year period. This analysis presents further results to suggest why positive feedback traders who invest in stocks that have recently doubled in price may be disappointed by future returns which fall short of past return performance.
The relative earnings-price ratio and the dividend yield are negatively related to the -year period, while the relative book-to-market ratio and firm size variables have a positive relationship. Thus , consistent
with the regression analysis of the predictability of returns in Table 4 , and the double-inscreening-period dummy has incremental predictive power.
Robustness C hecks
I repeat the analysis above using an additional screen: beginning-of-test period prices are required to be a minimum of $5.00 (in addition to the beginning-of-screening period minimum $5.00 price). The resulting sample size is reduced by about 10% to 10,157.
Such a decrease in sample size with this additional constraint is not surprising and simply
indicates that with an existing sample of firms with initial prices above $5.00, after 48 months approximately 10% will have dropped below that threshold. With the second sample I find a subtle but important additional survivorship bias that tends to make past performance of the remaining firms even more attractive. I repeat the analyses above and the results are qualitatively the same.
A further analysis of the probit results is presented in T able 6, which examines the average returns available to investors who make their decisions based on the probability of doubling. Test period return analysis is based on the probability of doubling in price from a probit analysis similar to that in Table 5 but based on the sample that includes the additional restriction of a minimum $5.00 end-of-screen-period share price. Average monthly and annualized returns are presented for individual firm-observations ( stock ) as well as the corresponding S&P 500 return ( market ) and the difference between the two ( excess ). Five sets of results are presented for 1%, 5%, 10%, 25%, and 50%
sample thresholds based on a sort of the probabilities. For example, after the 10,157 to highest, the 1,016 d the 1,016 test period returns are compared.
For the 1% threshold, the most likely to double stocks experience an average annualized return of 20.9%, 13.6% in excess of the corresponding market return. In contrast, the least likely to double stocks experience an average annualized return of -1.2% or -6.9% excess returns. The excess return difference between the high 1% and low 1% groups is 20.4%. With the less stringent screen comparing the top and bottom 5%, the excess return difference is 19.1%. With a 10% screen the difference is 18.3%, with a 25% screen the difference is 15.3%, and with a 50% screen the difference is still a large 10.6%. Thus these results suggest that screening stocks on the basis of their doubling probability may lead to profitable investment outcomes.
A final set of robustness checks are performed to investigate the extent to which the results depend on the test holding period he probability of doubling, various sub-period results, and the speed of doubling during the screening period. Monthly test period returns are gathered for the 10,157 firm-observations (i.e., the sample that includes the additional restriction of a minimum $5.00 end-of-screen-period share price) for each of the 48 months. For each firm-observation, returns (i.e., log normal stock price changes) are calculated and compared to S&P 500 returns in order to calculate firm-observation excess returns. For each of the 48 months, average returns are calculated and then cumulated. Results are presented in F igure 3.
Consistent with momentum studies (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1993 and 1995) ), for the first two months the sample outperforms the market by a small margin (cumulative 0.41% after two months). However, subsequently monthly excess returns are negative in every month from 3 to 35 and again in months 37 and 38 before showing modest gains for the remainder of the test period. Cumulative excess returns are as low as -17%. Thus the results do not appear to be sensitive to the duration of the test period.
Figure 3 also segregates the sample into those that doubled during the screening period (recall from Table 2 , 50.8% of the sample) and those that did not (49.2% of the sample).
The non-doubling sample shows little deviation from zero excess returns, with a 48-month cumulative excess return of -0.2%. In contrast, the doubling sample shows substantial under-performance, with a cumulative excess return as lows as -30.9% by month 38, before ending with a 48-month cumulative excess return of -28.0%. The highest decile portfolio has negative cumulative positive excess returns immediately and by the end of 48 months has a cumulative excess return of -56.6%. Thus the top and bottom decile sample differential is 65.1%, much greater than in other winner/loser studies.
F igure 5 compares samples based on the probability of doubling for the top and bottom decile and the top and bottom quartile. Probabilities are derived from the probit analysis results described above with all of the independent variables available as of the start of the test period. Consistent with Table 6 results, the low probability sample underperforms as expected, with the lowest quintile sample experiencing a cumulative excess return of -43.5% and the lowest decile -55.0%. In contrast, the high probability samples substantially outperform. The highest quintile portfolio has cumulative positive excess return of 16.7%. The highest decile portfolio has a cumulative excess return of 29.2%.
Thus the top and bottom decile sample differential is 84.2%. Finally, F igure 7 examines the test period results based on the speed of doubling during the screening period. In general, the quicker the doubling, the greater the test period underperformance. For example, for firms that double within 12 months the 48-month cumulative excess return is -53.4%; for firms that doubled in 13 to 24 months: -23.7%;
for firms that doubled in 25 to 36 months: -14.9%, for firms that doubled in 37 to 48 months: -19.0%; and for firms that did not double: -0.6%. Thus these results reinforce the earlier conclusion that stock returns contain a predictable component and reliance on the simple piece of information related to whether or not a stock has at least doubled in price in the past four years (or less) may be quite valuable.
Summary and Conclusions
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) argue that relying on simple heuristics to predict values can lead to severe and systematic errors. This paper examines one such simple heuristic whereby investors are attracted to buying stocks that have recently doubled in price in anticipation of further gains. This research shows why such positive feedback traders are often disappointed by investments in stocks with attractive track records, and also uncovers a new variable that adds incremental value to the predictability of stock returns in addition to previously uncovered in other studies. The research design categorizes is a departure from much of the literature that focuses on portfolios of stocks and that requires a fixed screening period.
I highlight the contrast between a backward looking survivorship-biased screening period sample and a survivorship-bias-free forward looking sample. Even including a mix of stellar and not stellar stocks, over half (50.8%) of the stocks in this survivorship-biased sample have at least doubled in price, with an attractive total sample median annual return of 20.1%, outperforming the market by 10.1%. However, in a subsequent four-year (survivorship-bias-free) test period, only 27.1% of sample stock prices doubled (or more), with a total sample median annual return of 6.6%., under-performing the market by 3.6%.
In addition, those that doubled in the screening period are less likely to double subsequently than those that had not doubled previously. Positive feedback traders experience significant cumulative excess return losses -28% over four years while fundamentalists experience near-zero excess returns.
Much of the cross-sectional variation in investment period returns can be explained not only by investment period market returns (a positive relationship) but also past stock performance (negative), whether the stock has recently doubled in price (negative), past earnings (positive), and various valuation-related metrics measured at the start of the investment period. A probit model identifies ex ante variables that are able to predict whether or not a stock will at least double in value over the investment period. Investing in stocks with a high (ex ante) probability of doubling leads to annualized excess returns of 11%-20% greater than investing in stocks with a low probability of doubling.
This research contributes to the behavioral finance literature and also offers a possible explanation of why individual investors may have a tendency to choose attractive-looking growth and large cap stocks, which have performed well in the survivorship-biased screening period, whereas value and small cap stocks tend to do better over the long-
term. This research also shows that stock return predictability may be based on some very simple information readily available to most investors.
While the results are consistent with the overreaction literature, as pioneered by DeBondt and Thaler, I -Winners, there are some unique elements similar to the way the 52-week high phenomenon is distinct from the momentum phenomenon. Given the simplicity of the measurement technique for individual investors who can readily measure when a stock has doubled in price (compared with the formation of portfolios based on rank-orders of returns), and given the close intuitive ties to many behavioral phenomenon, the doubling phenomenon provides one explanation why many investors are disappointed with stock investments and also provides a simple screen by which investors can avoid future disappointment.
T able 1 Summary Statistics
Mean (Mean), standard deviation (Std Dev), minimum (Min), 1% quantile cutoff (1% Q), median (Median), 99% cutoff (99% Q), and maximum (Max) firm/screening-period observations for all U.S. stocks available on Compustat. The screening period and corresponding test period for a particular firm are up to 48 months each depending on whether a stock price has doubled in the screening period (in which case the screening period ends; otherwise the screening period is 48 months) and how much data are available in a test period (48 months unless there are no more observations); thus a firm may have multiple observations as re-sampling occurs at the end of each test period. The variables, measured as of the end of the screening period, represent: the dollar value of annualized earnings per share (earn), earnings-to-price ratio divided by the S&P 500 earnings-to-price ratio (relep),
-to-market ratio divided by the S&P 500 book-to-market ratio (relbm), the annualized dividend per share divided by the price per share (divyld), the natural log of the market value of equity in millions of dollars (size), average monthly return during the screening period (scrmo), tsrmo), the corresponding average monthly S&P 500 return during the screening period (scsprmo), and the corresponding average monthly S&P 500 return during the test period (tssprmo). Returns are measured excluding dividends. Results are based on 11,264 observations. 
T able 2
Panel A describes the screening period and test period samples including the sample size, N, and the percentage of observations, % (see Table 1 for further descriptions of each sample). Panel B presents the means, differences, and difference-of-means t-test p-values for the variables described in Table 1 
T able 4 M ultivariate Regressions
Multivariate test period (tsrmo). The independent variables are described in Table 1 except for ddbl, which is a dummy  variable equ  otherwise; -of-screening-period earnings were negative and zero otherwise; and sic1 through sic9 which are dummy variables equal to 1 corresponding to the nine industries described in the text and zero otherwise. The independent variables are Winsorized based on the 1% and 99% cutoffs in Table 1 
T able 5 Probit A nalysis
In this probit analysis t doubles in the test period (or if the test period has fewer than 48 monthly observations then if the average monthly compound return, tsrmo, is greater than or equal to a rate that implies doubling over 48 months) and zero otherwise (ddbl2). The independent variables are described in Table 1 except for ddbl, which is a otherwise; and -of-screening-period earnings were negative and zero otherwise. The independent variables are Winsorized based on the 1% and 99% cutoffs in Table 1 . The intercept (int), t-statistics (in brackets below the coefficient estimates) and Pseudo R-squares (Pseudo R 2 ) are presented. Pseudo R-square is defined as 1 minus the ratio of the log likelihood for the estimated model divided by the log-likelihood for a model with only an intercept as an independent variable. Results are based on 11,264 observations. Test period return analysis based on the probability of doubling in price from the probit analysis (10,157 observations; based on the sample that includes the additional restriction of a minimum $5.00 end-ofscreen-period share price). Average monthly and annualized returns are presented for individual firmobservations (stock) as well as the corresponding S&P 500 return (market) and the difference between the two (excess). The number of observations (N) and the probit minimum cutoff for the high and maximum cutoff for the low (prob) are presented for 1%, 5%, 10%, 25%, and 50% sample thresholds based on a sort of the probabilities. 
Monthly
F igure 1 H ypothetical Price Patterns
Hypothetical price patterns for three different stocks relative to the end-of-screening period at month 0. All three stocks have an end-of-screening price at month t 0 of $20 and a tstock has a price of $40 at t--price of $5 at t-48. All three stocks would have been categorized in this study as having doubled in price depending on the beginning of screen date.
Firm-Observation #1
Firm-Observation #2 Firm-Observation #3
F igure 2 E xample of F irm-O bservation Data Generation Process
Example of data generation for a particular firm with available data from January 1988 to May 2007. An observation is a combination of a screening period and a corresponding test period. For each firm there may be several firm-observations depending on the amount of available data. In this example there are three firm-observations. Each screening period is the lesser of 48 months or the time it takes the stock price to double. Each test period is 48 months or less if there are no more available data, such as at the end of the sample period in May 2007.
F igure 3 T est Period C umulative Excess Return: O verall and Past Double/Non-Double Test period return analysis based on 48 monthly averages of log normal stock price changes in excess of log normal S&P 500 price changes. Month 0 is the start of the test period with zero excess returns. Based on 10,157 firm-observations (sample that includes the additional restriction of a minimum $5.00 end-ofscreen-period share price)
-observations for the sample that did not double in price during the --observations for .
F igure 4 T est Period C umulative Excess Return: Past W inners/Losers
Test period return analysis based on 48 monthly averages of log normal stock price changes in excess of log normal S&P 500 price changes. Month 0 is the start of the test period with zero excess returns. Based on 10,157 firm-observations (sample that includes the additional restriction of a minimum $5.00 end-ofscreen-period share price). Firms are sorted based on screening-period returns. The highest 10% and 25% F igure 5 T est Period C umulative Excess Return: Low/H igh Probability of Doubling Test period return analysis based on 48 monthly averages of log normal stock price changes in excess of log normal S&P 500 price changes. Month 0 is the start of the test period with zero excess returns. Based on 10,157 firm-observations (sample that includes the additional restriction of a minimum $5.00 end-ofscreen-period share price). Firms are sorted based on probit model probability of doubling in the test period. The highest 10% and 25% are indicated as F igure 6 T est Period C umulative Excess Return: Past Double/Non-Double Sub-period Results
Test period return analysis based on 48 monthly averages of log normal stock price changes in excess of log normal S&P 500 price changes. Month 0 is the start of the test period with zero excess returns. Based on 10,157 firm-observations (sample that includes the additional restriction of a minimum $5.00 end-ofscreen-period share price) for the entire sample. The sample that did not double in price during the --periods (based on the end-of-screen date) : pre-1995 (3,524 observations), 1996-2002 (3,376 observations), and post-2002 (3,258 observations) .
F igure 7 T est Period C umulative Excess Return: Past Double (Speed of Doubling)/Non-Double Test period return analysis based on 48 monthly averages of log normal stock price changes in excess of log normal S&P 500 price changes. Month 0 is the start of the test period with zero excess returns. Based on 10,157 firm-observations (sample that includes the additional restriction of a minimum $5.00 end-ofscreen-period share price) for the entire sample. The sample that did not double in price during the -less (1,249 observations), 13-24 months (1,509 observations), 25-36 months (1,375 observations), and 37-48 months (936 observations).
